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Abstract—We present a hierarchical model for assessing an
object-oriented program’s security. Security is quantified using
structural properties of the program code to identify the ways in
which ‘classified’ data values may be transferred between objects.
The model begins with a set of low-level security metrics based on
traditional design characteristics of object-oriented classes, such
as data encapsulation, cohesion and coupling. These metrics are
then used to characterise higher-level properties concerning the
overall readability and writability of classified data throughout
the program. In turn, these metrics are then mapped to well-
known security design principles such as ‘assigning the least
privilege’ and ‘reducing the size of the attack surface’. Finally,
the entire program’s security is summarised as a single security
index value. These metrics allow different versions of the same
program, or different programs intended to perform the same
task, to be compared for their relative security at a number
of different abstraction levels. The model is validated via an
experiment involving five open source Java programs, using a
static analysis tool we have developed to automatically extract
the security metrics from compiled Java bytecode.
Index Terms—Object-orientation, Software Quality, Software
Security, Software Metrics, Security Design Principles
I. INTRODUCTION
Software quality attributes have been studied extensively
including maintainability, performance, reusability and reli-
ability [1]. However, one of the most important program
attributes, which has received relatively little attention, is infor-
mation security. Here we interpret ‘security’ to mean control
over data confidentiality, i.e., the ability to read classified
values, and data integrity, i.e., the ability to update classified
variables. Both of these properties concern the (potential) flow
of classified data.
Some previous studies have defined metrics to measure
the security of programs. These include metrics which assess
security at the abstract system architecture level [2], at the
design phase [3] [4] and at the low level of program code [5].
However, none of this work to date is capable of measuring the
overall security of a given program with respect to information
flow.
Here we present a new hierarchical model capable of
assessing the overall security of a given object-oriented pro-
gram based on a static analysis of its code building on our
previously-published metrocs for UML class designs [3] [4].
The model consists of four hierarchical levels: (1) the potential
flow of ‘classified’ data values between objects, (2) the overall
readability and writability of classified data, (3) adherence to
standard security design principles, and (4) a total assessment
of the program’s security. Each of the top three levels aggre-
gates metrics from the level below, allowing the programmer to
view the program’s security at whatever level of abstraction
is desired. The metrics allow different versions of the same
program, or different programs intended to do the same job,
to be easily compared for their relative security.
To make the metrics easy to assess, we have developed a
static analysis tool which can analyse compiled Java bytecode
to produce metrics at all four levels of abstraction. By way
of validation, we also present the results of an experiment in
which the metrics were used to assess the relative security of
successive versions of five open-source, security-critical Java
programs.
II. RELATED WORK
Although much work has been done on software metrics
relatively few attempts have been made to quantify the security
of a given program. Chowdhury et al. defined a number of
security metrics for assessing the security of a given class
based on individual properties of its source code such as the
number of calls between methods in the class [5]. However,
this type of metric does not account for the interactions
between classes and therefore the overall program’s security.
Similarly, in other work they showed how existing metrics can
act as predictors of security vulnerabilities [6].
Bansiya and Davis developed an assessment framework to
measure the quality of object-oriented designs [1]. It maps
low-level design details (e.g., program size and complexity)
to higher-level quality attributes such as functionality and
reusability in order to identify the total quality measure
of a given object-oriented design. Even though their study
covered most design quality attributes, they did not consider
information security. Nevertheless, the approach is a sound
one, and we use it in our work.
There are also a few models which aim to quantify the
overall security of programs. One of these is the ‘system
vulnerability index’ which quantifies the overall security of
a system based on its higher-level characteristics such as
potentially neglectful acts [7]. Another is Alhazmi and Ray’s
approach which defines the security of a program based on
its vulnerability density [8]. To be effective, this technique
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Fig. 1. The hierarchical security metrics model
depends on knowledge of the existing vulnerabilities a pro-
gram might acquire. Manadhata et al. have also defined a
measurement of program security based on the various ways
a program might be attacked, as determined by its design
artefacts, including channels and data [2]. However, none
of these approaches directly consider data-flow security of a
program based on its design, as we do.
Our approach instead provides a hierarchical model and tool
for quantifying the security of whole object-oriented programs,
taking into account the interactions between classes and the
flow of classified data at the level of individual methods and
even individual statements. This is done by defining metrics
that measure how “classified” data values may flow between
fields, methods and classes. The metrics are defined at the Java
source code level, although the static-analysis support tool that
performs the calculations works on compiled Java bytecode,
so that we can analyse programs for which the source code
is not available. In particular, this paper shows how large
numbers of low-level metrics can be aggregated to give the
programmer an easy-to-understand assessment of the whole
program’s security.
III. THE SECURITY ASSESSMENT MODEL
In this section, we explain how our hierarchical security
assessment model provides a simple and transparent approach
for assessing the relative security of object-oriented programs.
The model can provide guidance for the development of secure
programs using a bottom-up approach. It ensures that attention
is given to lower-level detail in an object oriented program
such as the number of security-critical attributes and methods.
This in turn produces a measurement of a program’s security
in terms of its higher-level data flow properties.
The model for assessing the security of a given object-
oriented program is shown in Figure 1. Each of its four
levels defines a set of metrics for the security of a given
program at a certain abstraction level. The bottom level defines
numerous specific security metrics from the perspective of the
potential flow of classified fields in classes. The next level
defines security from the perspective of the overall readability
and writability of classified data. The next level up measures
security with respect to well-known security design principles
widely cited in the literature. Finally, the top level provides
a single security measurement which summarises the total
security of the entire program, allowing it to be compared
easily with other similar programs. Each of the higher-level
sets of metrics is defined based on those metrics at the level
beneath it.
A. Metrics for the Potential Flow of Classified Data
This section presents the bottom level of the model shown
in Figure 1. It briefly summarises our basic security metrics for
assessing the security of a given object-oriented program with
regard to the way its object-oriented design properties (data
encapsulation, cohesion, composition, coupling, extensibility,
design size and inheritance) influence the accessibility of any
classified data it contains. These metrics were developed after
studying guidelines for writing secure program code [9] [10].
Therefore, they aim to discover many of the vulnerabilities
associated with writing insecure code. Most of these metrics
were defined for Unified Modeling Language designs in previ-
ous work [3] [4]. Here we adapt and extend those definitions
for Java program code.
Specifically, these metrics assess the accessibility of clas-
sified data items with regard to potential data or control
flow. Initially, we rely on the programmer to label those
attributes that (may) contain ‘classified’ values. Then, the tool
automatically determines other attributes (fields) whose values
may also be influenced by this ‘classified’ data. We consider a
method to be classified if it is has been labelled as ‘classified’
by the programmer or it interacts with (reads or writes) at
least one classified attribute. In particular a programmer may
label a method classified to indicate that it returns data read
from a high-security external input stream or file. We also
consider a class to be ‘critical’ if it contains attributes labelled
as classified or it has an attribute which may derive its value
from a ‘classified’ attribute.
The data encapsulation-based metrics (CIDA, CCDA, COA
and RPB) assess the direct accessibility of classified attributes
and methods [3] as well as data accessibility through re-
flection. The cohesion-based metrics (CAIW, CAAI, CAIW,
CMW and CWMP) measure the potential flow of classified
attributes’ values to accessor, mutator and writing methods,
penalising programs with a large amount of classified flow [3].
The coupling-based metric (CCC) measures interactions be-
tween classes and classified attributes, rewarding programs that
minimise such interactions [4], because it has been proven
that strong coupling makes security attacks easier [11]. The
composition-based metric (CPCC) rewards programs that use
private inner classes for holding classified data, and penalises
the use of outer classes for this purpose [4]. The extensibility-
based metrics (CCE, CME, UACA, UCAM and UCAC) re-
ward programs with fewer opportunities for extending critical
classes or classified methods, and penalise unused classified
attributes, methods or critical classes. These are points at
which an attacker can access classified data without affecting
the system’s observable behaviour [12]. The inheritance-based
metrics (CSP, CSI, CMI and CAI) reward programs with
fewer opportunities for inheriting from critical superclasses,
since these allow subclasses to gain privileges over classified
TABLE I
DATA FLOW METRICS
Name Data Flow Metric Description
CAT Classified Attributes Total The total number of classified attributes in the program.
CMT Classified Methods Total The total number of classified methods in the program.
CCT Critical Classes Total The total number of critical classes in the program.
CIDA
Classified Instance Data
Accessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified instance attributes to the number of classified
attributes in the program.
CCDA
Classified Class Data
Accessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified class attributes to the number of classified attributes
in the program.
COA
Classified Operation
Accessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified methods to the number of classified methods in the
program.
RPB Reflection Package Boolean A boolean value representing whether the Java program imports the reflection package (1) or not (0).
CMAI
Classified Mutator Attribute
Interactions
The ratio of the sum of all interactions between mutators and classified attributes to the possible
maximum number of interactions between mutators and classified attributes in the program.
CAAI
Classified Accessor Attribute
Interactions
The ratio of the sum of all interactions between accessors and classified attributes to the possible
maximum number of interactions between accessors and classified attributes in the program.
CAIW
Classified Attributes Interaction
Weight
The ratio of the number of all interactions with classified attributes to the total number of all
interactions with all attributes in the program.
CMW Classified Methods Weight The ratio of the number of classified methods to the total number of methods in the program.
CWMP
Classified Writing Methods
Proportion
The ratio of the number of methods which write classified attributes to the total number of classified
methods in the program.
CCC Critical Classes Coupling
The ratio of the number of all classes’ links with classified attributes to the total number of possible
links with classified attributes in the program.
CPCC Composite-Part Critical Classes
The ratio of the number of critical composed-part classes to the total number of critical classes in the
program.
CCE Critical Classes Extensibility
The ratio of the number of the non-finalised critical classes in program to the total number of critical
classes in the program.
CME Classified Methods Extensibility
The ratio of the number of the non-finalised classified methods in program to the total number of
classified methods in the program.
UACA
Unaccessed Assigned Classified
Attribute
The ratio of the number of classified attributes that are assigned but never used to the total number of
classified attributes in the program.
UCAM
Uncalled Classified Accessor
Method
The ratio of the number of classified methods that access a classified attribute but are never called by
other methods to the total number of classified methods in the program.
UCAC Unused Critical Accessor Class
The ratio of the number of classes which contain classified methods that access classified attributes
but are never used by other classes to the total number of critical classes in the program.
CDP Critical Design Proportion The ratio of the number of critical classes to the total number of classes in the program.
CSCP
Critical Serialized Classes
Proportion
The ratio of the number of critical serialized classes to the total number of critical classes in the
program.
CSP Critical Superclasses Proportion
The ratio of the number of critical superclasses to the total number of critical classes in the
program’s inheritance hierarchy.
CSI Critical Superclasses Inheritance
The ratio of the sum of classes which may inherit from each critical superclass to the number of
possible inheritances from all critical classes in the program’s inheritance hierarchy.
CMI Classified Methods Inheritance
The ratio of the number of classified methods which can be inherited in a hierarchy to the total
number of classified methods in the program’s inheritance hierarchy.
CAI Classified Attributes Inheritance
The ratio of the number of classified attributes which can be inherited in a hierarchy to the total
number of classified attributes in the program’s inheritance hierarchy.
data [4]. The design size-based metrics (CDP and CSCP)
reward programs with a lower proportion of critical classes [4]
and critical serialized classes. Finally, we at this level consider
absolute security metrics which count the number of classified
attributes (CAT), classified methods (CMT) and critical classes
(CCT) in a program. Many metrics are ratios, so in situations
where the program does not have the relevant constructs or
features, which would produce a zero denominator in a metric,
the whole metric is treated as zero.
The full collection of metrics is shown in Table I. Some
measure obvious ways of directly reading from or writing to
a classified attribute or field in a program. Others measure less
obvious forms of data flow such as writing a classified value
to an external device or file, serializing a class containing a
classified value, or assigning a value to a classified attribute
but not subsequently reading it (which allows a malicious
programmer to add code to access the value without changing
the program’s observable behaviour). Each relative metric has
been scaled to fit within the range 0 to 1 with lower values
indicating more secure code. In addition, informative absolute
measures such as the total number of classes which contain
security-critical data are also included. Further detail on the
rationale for these metrics can be found elsewhere [3] [4].
B. Metrics for the Readability and Writability of Classified
Data
The large number of primitive metrics in Table I can make
it difficult for the programmer to gain an understanding of
a program’s overall security. Therefore, the second level of
TABLE II
READABILITY AND WRITABILITY SECURITY METRICS
Readability and Writability Metric Name Related Data Flow Security Metrics Weight
Readability of Classified Attributes RCA CIDA + CCDA + CAI 4
Writability of Classified Attributes WCA CMAI + CAAI + UACA 4
Readability via Classified Methods RCM COA + CME + CMI 3
Writability via Classified Methods WCM CAIW + CMW + CWMP + UCAM 3
Readability via Critical Classes RCC RPB + CPCC + CCE + CDP + CSP 2
Writability via Critical Classes WCC CCC + UCAC + CSCP + CSI 2
Security Absolute Measurements SAM CAT + CMT + CCT 1
metrics in our hierarchy summarises these metrics with regard
to the essential properties of the readability and writability
of classified data. As shown in Table II, there are seven
distinct metrics at this level: readability of classified attributes,
writability of classified attributes, readability via classified
methods, writability via classified methods, readability via
critical classes and writability via critical classes, plus the
absolute measurements.
These metrics sum the low-level, data-flow metrics within
relevant, non-overlapping security classifications. This allows
us to produce a smaller, more easily understood, set of security
metrics which still contains sufficient information to give
an accurate measure of a program’s security. For example,
data flow security metrics which are mainly concerned with
measuring a classified attribute’s direct readability (i.e., CIDA,
CCDA and CAI) are mapped to the readability of classified
attributes classification. Those security metrics which measure
ways in which a classified data value can be accessed via
a method that reads that attribute or reads from an external
source of classified data (i.e., COA, CME and CMI) are
mapped to the readability via classified methods classification,
and similarly for metrics relevant to the readability of classified
data via operations that access the critical class containing it
(i.e., RPB, CPCC, CCE, CDP and CSP). The other higher-
level metrics aggregate those metrics whose main goal is to
give a measurement of the direct writability of a classified
attribute (i.e., CMAI, CAAI and UACA), those that concern
writability via classified methods (i.e., CAIW, CMW, CWMP
and UCAM), and those that measure writability via a critical
class (i.e., CCC, UCAC, CSCP and CSI). The seventh classi-
fication sums the absolute measurements which quantify the
total number of classified attributes and methods, and the total
number of critical classes in the entire program.
However, not all of these seven classifications may be
considered equally important. Therefore, each sum is weighted
as per the right-hand column in Table II, so that metrics
which measure direct accessibility of classified data are given
higher weights than those that measure indirect accessibility
of classified values.
C. Metrics for Specific Security Design Principles
This section presents the third level from the bottom in our
pyramid-like hierarchical model. Numerous ‘security design
principles’ have been published in the literature for developing
and assessing security-critical systems [13] [14] [9] [15] [16].
TABLE III
SECURITY DESIGN PRINCIPLE METRICS
Security Design Principle Name
Related Readability and
Writability Metrics
Grant Least Privilege PLP WCA + WCM + WCC
Reduce Attack Surface PRAS RCA + RCM + RCC
Secure the Weakest Link PSWL WCA + WCM
Fail-Safe Defaults PFSD RCA + RCM
Least Common Mechanism PLCM RCC + WCC
Isolation PI WCC
Economy of Mechanism PEM SAM
Although these principles were generally not developed with
software analysis in mind, we contend that several of them
can be helpful in gaining an intuitive understanding of the
overall security of a program. Therefore the metrics at this
level group the readability and writability metrics to produce
metrics relevant to particular design principles as shown in
Table III.
Seven relevant security design principles were chosen to
measure the security of Java programs: assign least privilege,
reduce the size of the attack surface, isolation, economy of
mechanism, use the least common mechanism, secure the
weakest link and fail-safe defaults. Each of these was then
quantified as the sum of relevant readability and writability
metrics. In this case, however, some lower-level readability and
writability metrics appear more than once since they cannot
be uniquely mapped to the design principles.
Grant least privilege: The principle of granting the least
privilege means “programs and users should run with the least
privilege to complete their job” [13]. The main purpose of
this principle is to minimize the interactions among privileged
users [13]. To adhere to this principle, systems must restrict
the privileges of their users to the least possible. For object-
oriented programs, this means a program that has the necessary
functionality but whose methods can do the fewest possible
actions is the most secure. In our case, a program whose
critical data is writable from the fewest attributes, and by
the fewest methods and classes is considered to be a secure
program with respect to this principle.
Reduce the Attack Surface: The principle of reducing
the size of the attack surface aims to limit access to secret
data. Howard identified several techniques to reduce the attack
surface size of a given system, including reducing the amount
TABLE IV
TOTAL SECURITY INDEX METRIC
Name Metric Definition
TSI Total Security Index
PLP + PRAS + PSWL + PFSD +
PLCM + PI + PEM
of running code and reducing access to entry points [9]. For
our purposes, this means a program should have the fewest
possible readable classified attributes, classified methods and
critical classes. It should also mean that there are as few
methods as possible that can write classified data externally.
Secure the Weakest Link: According to Viega and Mc-
Graw, one way to meet the principle of securing the weakest
link is to limit the capabilities of technical support as much
as possible by reducing functionalities. As a result of having
less functionality, a program would have less security expo-
sure [14]. In our case, a program with the fewest writable
classified attributes and methods would satisfy the requirement
of this principle.
Fail-Safe Defaults: Bishop defines this principle to mean
“unless a subject is given explicit access to an object, it should
be denied access to that object” [15]. This principle aims to
reduce the capabilities of individual classes with regard to the
readability of critical data. Hence, for a program to adhere
to this principle, each class should have the fewest classified
attributes and methods which can access classified data.
Least Common Mechanism: The principle of least com-
mon mechanism means that a mechanism used to access
resources should not be shared [15]. This principle indicates
that critical data can be transmitted to unauthorised parties
through shared resources, and so such sharing should be
minimised [15]. In our case, this means that an object-oriented
program with the least readability and writability of critical
classes would adhere to the requirement of this principle.
Isolation: The principle of isolation’s main goal is to
minimise the amount of potential damage to a system via
enforcement of security privileges [14]. To achieve this goal,
we have to consider two aspects. One is breaking up the
system into small subsystems [9]. The second is to isolate
code which has security privileges [9]. In our case, an object-
oriented program which has the least writability of critical
classes would adhere to the security principle of isolation.
Economy of Mechanism: The economy of mechanism
principle is defined by Bishop as “security mechanisms should
be as simple as possible” [15]. This principle is important
during the software design process due to the fact that unin-
tended information flow paths could result from a complex
design [13]. This complexity could result in design and
implementation errors which make the entire system or part
of it more vulnerable. For our purposes, a program with the
fewest numbers of classified attributes and methods, and the
fewest number of critical classes would satisfy the economy
of mechanism principle.
To define security design principle metrics in terms of the
readability and writability metrics, we reviewed each of these
principles in the context of their significance for program
design. This analysis showed that the least privilege principle
is associated with all of the writability measurements while the
attack surface principle is linked to all of the readability met-
rics. Furthermore, securing the weakest link is concerned with
minimising the writability of security critical attributes and
functions, and hence it is linked to the classified attributes and
methods readability metrics. On the other hand, the fail-safe
defaults principle aims to reduce the readability of attributes
and functions, therefore it can be linked to the classified
attributes and methods readability metrics. The least common
mechanism principle is associated with the critical classes’
readability and writability metrics. However, isolation aims to
reduce the amount of writability within classes, and hence it is
associated with the critical classes writability metric. Finally,
economy of mechanism’s main goal is to minimise the amount
of critical data in the program. This means that the absolute
security metric is the best one for this requirement. As shown
in Table III the metric for each security design principle is
then simply the sum of the relevant readability and writability
metrics.
D. A Total Security Index
Finally, we define the highest level of our model to be a
single Total Security Index (TSI) for a whole program. This
index provides a simple way to compare the relevant security
of entire object-oriented programs based on information ob-
tained from lower-level security metrics. The TSI is simply
the sum of the security design principle metrics, as shown in
Table IV.
Of course, as we go higher in our hierarchy, the number of
metrics is reduced, but they also become less discerning. This
is inevitable in such a model. In practice therefore, significant
decisions should not be made on the basis of the more abstract
metrics alone. Having appraised the overall situation using the
higher-level metrics, the programmer should ‘drill down’ to the
lower-level ones to understand the particular security issues
affecting the program in question. Our software tool makes it
easy to do this.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section demonstrates the validity of our security as-
sessment model empirically. Firstly, we developed a program
capable of calculating security metrics from compiled Java
bytecode at all of the abstraction levels described above. An
example of its output is shown in Figure 2. It lists each of the
metrics at all four levels and displays the design principles
metrics graphically.
Our hypothesis for testing the metrics is that related pro-
grams, developed for similar requirements and objectives,
should produce better results as bugs are fixed and the program
code is improved. In other words, the program’s Total Security
Index should decrease, indicating more secure code, from one
long patch to the next (or at least should stay stable). However,
we may also reasonably expect to see an increase in the TSI,
Fig. 2. Example of Hierarchical Metrics Produced by the Java Bytecode Analyser for Apache James (1)
indicating less secure code, if the program has major new
functionality, and hence more potential vulnerabilities, added.
A. Approach
We conducted our experiment on five large-scale open
source Java programs. We used our Java bytecode analyser
to assess the relative security of different versions of the same
program, since this makes the results meaningfully compa-
rable. (Comparing the relative security of totally unrelated
programs would not be informative, unless they were intended
to implement exactly the same security-critical functions.) The
chosen projects were all security-related, so we could reason-
ably expect successive releases to be more secure than their
predecessors. The projects were selected from the most often
downloaded security projects on the SourceForge website [17].
A list of the open source programs was taken from Java
Source [18] which provides some descriptions about different
Java open source programs. For each project, we chose a
specific version which was modified in a number of subsequent
updates, to fix bugs found in the previous releases. In this way
we could compare different versions of each program with
identical functionality but (hopefully) improved code quality.
B. The Programs Analysed
The chosen programs consisted of the following: Apache
James (two different programs) (releases 2.0.0, 2.1.0, 2.1.1,
2.1.2 and 2.1.3; and releases 2.2.0, 2.3.0, 2.3.1 and 2.3.2),
SQL Jackcess (releases 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6),
ACEGI (releases 1.0, 1.0RC1, 1.0RC2, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and
1.5 ) and JGroups (releases 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4).
Apache James was developed by the Apache Software
Foundation to be a Java SMTP and POP3 Mail server and
NNTP News server [19]. Jackcess is designed to work as
a Java library for reading from and writing to MS Access
databases [18]. ACEGI is a security program designed to
provide applications with comprehensive authentication, au-
thorization, instance-based access control, channel security
and human user detection capabilities [18]. JGroups provides
several features mainly related to multicast communications
using several networking transport protocols (e.g., TCP) [18].
TABLE V
APACHE JAMES 2.0.0 TO 2.1.3 DATA FLOW METRICS
Metric 2.0.0 2.1.0 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3
CAT 7 11 11 11 9
CMT 52 57 57 57 37
CCT 4 4 4 4 5
CIDA 0 0.0909091 0.0909091 0.0909091 0.1111111
CCDA 0 0 0 0 0
COA 0.4807692 0.508772 0.508772 0.508772 0.8108108
RPB 0 0 0 0 0
CMAI 0.005383 0.0085288 0.0085288 0.0085288 0.0061466
CAAI 0.0133761 0.0095368 0.009498 0.0095109 0.0040431
CAIW 0.0318506 0.0405858 0.0403326 0.0402991 0.0167415
CMW 0.0482375 0.0405694 0.0402258 0.0402258 0.0259285
CWMP 0.1153846 0 0 0 0
CPCC 1 1 1 1 1
CCC 0.0100733 0.0073835 0.0073093 0.0073093 0.0078169
CCE 1 1 1 1 1
CME 1 1 1 1 1
UACA 0 0 0 0 0
UCAM 0.64 0.6753247 0.6753247 0.6753247 0.7407408
UCAC 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
CSP 0.3333333 1 1 1 0.5
CSI 0.0021368 0.0050761 0.0050251 0.0050251 0.0025126
CMI 0.2 1 1 1 0.7
CAI 0 0 0 0 0
CDP 0.0254777 0.020202 0.02 0.02 0.025
CSCP 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.2
C. Program Annotations
To let our bytecode analyser know which data values
were considered security-critical we first needed to annotate
the programs to identify their ‘classified’ data fields. We
manually labelled a number of attributes in each project as
‘classified’, choosing attributes whose names and associated
code comments indicated that they are most likely to store
confidential data. We labelled the same attributes for each
different release of the same program in order to make our
comparisons meaningful.
For example, in the first release of Apache James, we
annotated the following attributes as classified: userName,
password and algorithm in the userDefault class.
In addition to these attributes, we also labelled the fol-
lowing as classified in the later releases (2.2.0 onwards):
fieldPassword and fieldUser in the Account
class. With regard to the SQL Jackcess project, we an-
notated two different attributes as classified: SID and
RESERVEDWORDS in the Database class. In the ACEGI
project, we annotated three different attributes in two differ-
ent classes to be classified: username and password in
the ComparisonAttribute class, and password in the
userAttribute class. In the JGroups project we chose the
following attributes to be treated as classified: id and xid in
the Xid class.
D. Analysis of Experimental Results
Given that lower values of each metric are considered
more secure, programs whose metrics decrease are considered
to have improved. We expected that these security-related
programs would increase their security with each new release,
except when significant new functionality has been added.
The results of applying our tool to each release of each
project are summarised here for each of the four levels in
Figure 1. The lowest level is the metrics for classified data
flow (Table I). Given the large number of these metrics, we
only present a representative example here. Table V shows
the results for Apache James, versions 2.0.0 to 2.1.3. In these
tables a downwards arrow indicates the metric has decreased
(i.e., security has improved) since the previous release, an
upwards arrow says that the metric has increased (i.e., security
has worsened), and a right-pointing arrow means there has
been no change to this particular metric. The results for
Apache James (1) show that a large number of its lowest level
metrics have increased in the second version when compared
to the initial one. This is due to the increase of the total
number of classified attributes and methods (as evidenced by
the CAT and CMT counts). This indicates that new security-
critical code was added to the program which has caused these
metrics to increase, meaning that overall program security has
gotten worse. However, the security metrics of the following
two versions (i.e., 2.1.1 and 2.1.2) have managed either to
decrease or stay stable which indicates an improvement in
the overall security of the program. (No new security-critical
code was added in these versions.) With regard to the last
version, most of the metrics have decreased apart from those
associated with measuring the proportion of classified methods
which interact with classified attributes and number of critical
classes (e.g. CCC, UCAM and CDP). Similarly detailed sets of
data flow metrics were produced for the other four programs.
At the next level of abstraction are the readability and
writability security metrics as shown in Tables VI to X for all
five programs. Overall, most of the programs show a general
improvement in their security metrics from one version to
the next. This includes the results for Apache James (1),
versions 2.0.0 to 2.1.3. The only exception in this program
is some of the readability and writability security metrics for
the second release since this release introduced new security-
critical features as mentioned previously, as clearly shown by
the SAM metric. Another obvious exception is Apache James
(2), versions 2.2.0 to 2.3.2, where only one metric (i.e. SAM)
in version 2.3.0 has increased due to newly added security-
critical code as well. However, the remainder of the metrics
for both Apache programs decrease as the programs evolve,
revealing an expected improvement in overall security.
One obviously exceptional program for the readability and
writability security metrics is Jackcess (Table VIII) which has
shown an increase in the metrics associated with classified
methods. This is clearly shown in the program’s WCM metric
which has increased every time SAM increased. This is due
to new classified methods since both WCM and SAM are
related to measuring readability and writability via classified
methods. However, once the program stabilises, its security
metrics decrease. This is clearly shown in the last two versions
by a decrease in the security metric SAM indicating that there
are no new security-critical features introduced, allowing an
improvement in overall security. This also applies to ACEGI
(Table IX) versions 1.2 to 1.5 with the exception of the last
version (i.e., ACEGI 1.5) where two security metrics have
increased. This version has worsen security with regard to
its WCM and RCC metrics. Since the absolute SAM metric
has not changed from its predecessor, this suggests that no
security-critical code has been added to the program, so some
non security-critical code must have been removed from the
TABLE VI
APACHE JAMES (1) READABILITY AND WRITABILITY SECURITY METRICS
Program RCA WCA RCM WCM RCC WCC SAM
James_2.0.0 0 0.075037 5.0423 2.5064182 4.7176221 1.02442 63
James_2.1.0 0.3636364 0.072262 7.5263 2.2694396 6.040404 1.524919 72
James_2.1.1 0.3636364 0.072107 7.5263 2.2676495 6.04 1.524669 72
James_2.1.2 0.3636364 0.072159 7.5263 2.267549 6.04 1.524669 72
James_2.1.3 0.4444444 0.040759 7.5324 2.350233 5.05 1.620659 51
TABLE VII
APACHE JAMES (2) READABILITY AND WRITABILITY SECURITY METRICS
Program RCA WCA RCM WCM RCC WCC SAM
James_2.2.0 0.6153846 0.021565 7.938462 2.29032 7.376016 1.443 72
James_2.3.0 0.3809524 0.016728 6.755002 2.2641 7.051546 1.0086 108
James_2.3.1 0.3809524 0.016728 6.755002 2.264 7.051546 1.0086 108
James_2.3.2 0.3809524 0.016721 6.755002 2.2636 7.051546 1.0086 108
TABLE VIII
SQL JACKCESS READABILITY AND WRITABILITY SECURITY METRICS
Program RCA WCA RCM WCM RCC WCC SAM
Jackcess_1.0 0 0.233656 5.375 3.362 6.19048 0.111 45
Jackcess_1.1 0.276 0.261922 5.023 3.794 6.19048 0.093 72
Jackcess_1.2 0 0.338507 5.423 3.239 6.19048 0.108 53
Jackcess_1.3 0.222 0.313479 4.868 3.684 5.58333 0.105 90
Jackcess_1.4 0.222 0.313479 4.868 3.684 5.58333 0.105 90
Jackcess_1.5 0.4 0.217297 4.964 3.449 5.7353 0.551 77
Jackcess_1.6 0 0.211728 5.204 3.39 5.7051 0.536 69
TABLE IX
ACEGI READABILITY AND WRITABILITY SECURITY METRICS
Program RCA WCA RCM WCM RCC WCC SAM
ACEGI_1.0 0 0.01753 5.78571 3.047665 6.02299 2 24
ACEGI_1.0_RC1 0 0.01682 6 3.02482 6.01194 2 12
ACEGI_1.0_RC2 0 0.01605 6 3.02352 6.0113 2 12
ACEGI_1.1 0 0.01735 6 3.04721 6.0229 2 24
ACEGI_1.2 0 0.01688 5.8 3.04754 6.0224 2 25
ACEGI_1.3 0 0.01505 5.8 3.04153 6.0194 2 25
ACEGI_1.4 0 0.01457 5.8 3.0405 6.0194 2 25
ACEGI_1.5 0 0.01523 5.8 3.042 6.0198 2 25
TABLE X
JGROUPS READABILITY AND WRITABILITY SECURITY METRICS
Program RCA WCA RCM WCM RCC WCC SAM
Jgroups_2.1 2.87290654 0.082377452 5.87274885 3.223844214 6.36905545 0.578395318 1247
Jgroups_2.2 2.86059322 0.08796402 5.862600228 2.890358991 6.363130332 0.645528986 659
Jgroups_2.3 3.414175054 0.058477185 6.37067205 2.915099895 6.733156828 0.662040983 869
Jgroups_2.4 3.097059418 0.046523018 6.32658255 3.057055518 6.69717832 0.782921134 1080
TABLE XI
APACHE JAMES (1) SECURITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES METRICS
Program PLP PRAS PSWL PFSD PLCM PI PEM
James_2.0.0 3.605874835 9.75992975 2.58145481 5.04230766 5.742042118 1.024420024 63
James_2.1.0 3.866621133 13.93035628 2.34170189 7.88995224 7.565323283 1.524919243 72
James_2.1.1 3.864425309 13.92995224 2.33975651 7.88995224 7.564668799 1.524668799 72
James_2.1.2 3.864376395 13.92995224 2.339707596 7.88995224 7.564668799 1.524668799 72
James_2.1.3 4.01165019 13.02687684 2.390991341 7.97687684 6.67065885 1.62065885 51
TABLE XII
APACHE JAMES (2) SECURITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES METRICS
Program PLP PRAS PSWL PFSD PLCM PI PEM
James_2.2.0 3.7548808 15.92986 2.3118814 8.5538462 8.8190157 1.442999 72
James_2.3.0 3.2894386 14.1875 2.2808253 7.1359541 8.0601596 1.008613 108
James_2.3.1 3.2893811 14.1875 2.2807679 7.1359541 8.0601596 1.008613 108
James_2.3.2 3.2890002 14.1875 2.280387 7.1359541 8.0601596 1.008613 108
TABLE XIII
SQL JACKCESS SECURITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES METRICS
Program PLP PRAS PSWL PFSD PLCM PI PEM
Jackcess_1.0 3.7062104 11.565476 3.595684 5.375 6.3010025 0.110526 45
Jackcess_1.1 4.1487711 11.489594 4.056179 5.299118 6.2830688 0.092593 72
Jackcess_1.2 3.6856083 11.613553 3.577603 5.423077 6.2984762 0.108 53
Jackcess_1.3 4.102684 10.67348 3.997825 5.090147 5.6881927 0.104859 90
Jackcess_1.4 4.102684 10.67348 3.997825 5.090147 5.6881927 0.104859 90
Jackcess_1.5 4.2168625 11.098931 3.666357 5.363636 6.2857992 0.550505 77
Jackcess_1.6 4.1468698 10.90921 3.610686 5.204082 6.2413124 0.536184 69
TABLE XIV
ACEGI SECURITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES METRICS
Program PLP PRAS PSWL PFSD PLCM PI PEM
ACEGI_1.0 5.065196448 11.80870271 3.065196448 5.7857142 8.022988506 2 24
ACEGI_1.0_RC1 5.041644136 12.0119403 3.041644136 6 8.011940299 2 12
ACEGI_1.0_RC2 5.039570324 12.01129944 3.039570324 6 8.011299435 2 12
ACEGI_1.1 5.06456727 12.02285714 3.064567271 6 5.022857142 2 24
ACEGI_1.2 5.064423679 11.82240898 3.064423679 5.8 8.022408964 2 25
ACEGI_1.3 5.0565713 11.8194175 3.0565713 5.8 8.019417476 2 25
ACEGI_1.4 5.055065839 11.81937048 3.055065839 5.8 8.01937046 2 25
ACEGI_1.5 5.05725547 11.819802 3.057254738 5.8 8.01980198 2 25
TABLE XV
JGROUPS SECURITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES METRICS
Program PLP PRAS PSWL PFSD PLCM PI PEM
Jgroups_2.1 3.884616984 15.11471084 3.306221666 8.74565539 6.947450768 0.578395318 1247
Jgroups_2.2 3.623851997 15.08632378 2.978323011 8.723193448 7.008659318 0.645528986 659
Jgroups_2.3 3.635618063 16.51800393 2.97357708 9.784847104 7.395197811 0.662040983 869
Jgroups_2.4 3.886499671 16.12082029 3.103578536 9.423641968 7.480099454 0.782921134 1080
program increasing the relative proportion of critical code.
This was confirmed by inspecting the program which showed
that there was a decrease in the total number of non-critical
classes. The program used to consist of 413 classes and in the
last version it only contains 404.
By contrast, the JGroups programs (Table X) show the
most atypical result in this experiment as most of the security
metrics continued to increase as the program evolved. The
main reason for this is clearly shown by the SAM metrics
which indicate that there is a significant increase in the number
of security-critical features. For example, the data flow metrics
of the JGroups 2.3 and 2.4 releases show that the number of
classified attributes, i.e., those into which classified values may
flow, has increased from 160 attributes in JGroups 2.3 to 208
classified attributes in JGroups 2.4.
At the third level of abstraction we have metrics for the
security design principles as shown in Tables XI to XV.
For instance, with respect to the security design principles
of granting least privilege (PLP) and securing the weakest
link (PSWL), the results in Tables XI to XV show that
Apache James version 2.3.2 is the version which best satisfies
these principles. For reducing the attack surface size (PRAS),
Apache James version 2.0.0 is the version which best meets
this requirement. Apache James version 2.0.0 also has the
lowest metrics for readability of the program’s classified
attributes and methods. This means that it is also the best
with regard to the principle of fail-safe defaults (PFSD). For
the design principle of the least common mechanism (PLCM),
ACEGI version 1.1 best adheres to this principle. For the
security design principle of isolation (PI), Jackcess version 1.1
is best. For economy of mechanism (PEM), which means
minimising the amount of critical data, the ACEGI programs
are the best among all the programs with regard to this absolute
measure.
Finally, the top of our hierarchy is the Total Security Index.
As shown in Table XVI, for most cases the results confirm our
TABLE XVI
ALL PROGRAM’S TOTAL SECURITY INDEX (TSI)
Program Release 1 Release 2 Release 3 Release 4 Release 5 Release 6 Release 7 Release 8
James 1 90.756029 109.11887 109.1134239 109.1133261 86.69771 - - -
James 2 112.812486 143.96249 143.962376 143.961615 - - - -
Jackcess 75.6539 103.36932 83.706322 119.657187 119.657188 108.18209 99.64834 -
ACEGI 59.747798 48.10716887 48.10173952 60.174849 60.773665 60.7519776 60.7488726 60.75411
Jgroups 1285.577051 697.0659 909.96928 1120.79756 - - - -
intuition that in general the security of the programs should
improve as they evolve. For instance, both Apache James
programs improve their security in all revisions of its code
base except for their second one where a large amount of
new code was added. The major exception is JGroups whose
TSI shows a net increase indicating that its total security has
worsened. This overall increase in TSI was primarily due to
the security-critical functionality added in later releases. The
other exception is ACEGI which has undergone a number
of significant changes that affect security. Release ACEGI
1.0RC1 decreased the number of its classified methods while
ACEGI 1.1 increased them by twelve. However, once the
number of classified methods stabilised, the following releases
showed the expected steady improvement in security until
the last one which had a slight increase in the amount of
interactions between methods and classified attributes.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a new hierarchical security assess-
ment model which provides a simple and transparent approach
for assessing the security of object-oriented programs at var-
ious levels of abstraction. The model takes into account low-
level characteristics of an object-oriented program’s design,
such as data encapsulation and cohesion, in order to mea-
sure higher-level characteristics such as the readability and
writability of security-critical data. These are then grouped
to define another set of metrics which match the security
design principles widely promoted in the literature. Finally,
these values are used to quantify the overall security of the
program of interest as a single metric.
This assessment can provide software developers with a
simple way of comparing different versions of a program
from the perspectives of classified data confidentiality and
integrity. We have validated the model on several large-scale
programs. For this purpose, we developed a tool which extracts
the metrics from compiled Java bytecode automatically. The
case study analysed multiple versions of five programs to see
how their security level changed. All of these programs had
security-critical data which needs to be protected. The results
matched our intuitions about the way a program’s security
changes as its code is either debugged, which should improve
security, or extended, which may make security worse.
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